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In the beginning of his Våkyapad¥ya, Bhart®hari describes grammar as dvåram 
apavargasya ‘the door to liberation’. This remark has drawn the attention of several 
scholars, none of whom have been able to explain how the study of grammar could 
possibly lead to the highest aim of Indian religions, liberation from this world. Some 
complain about the lack of information about this in the Våkyapad¥ya. E.R. Sreekrishna 
Sarma, for example, states (1986: 583): "The statements of Bhart®hari available to us do 
not speak of the path towards mok∑a except that the study of Vyåkaraˆa will ultimately 
lead one to emancipation." Madeleine Biardeau (1964: 269-70) is more drastic; she 
believes that Bhart®hari cannot be taken literally on this point: "Il ne faudrait alors pas 
trop presser le sens des affirmations, d'ailleurs vagues, concernant la délivrance, ni 
prendre sans plus de précautions à la lettre l'hémistiche [qui dit]: ‘il accède au Brahman 
suprême’." Other authors think that the expression ßabdapËrva yoga ‘yoga preceeded by 
words’ refers to the path, which would therefore be some kind of yoga.2 But this 
expression occurs only in the old V®tti, whose author is, in all probability, different 
from the author of the Våkyapad¥ya. In view of all these difficulties Jan E.M. Houben, 
in his recent and outstanding study of the Sambandha-samuddeßa (1992: 418), comes to 
the following conclusion: "If at all cost one wants to see the [Våkyapad¥ya] as a work 
contributing to mok∑a ‘liberation’ it is not because an exclusive meditative practice 
(such as ßabdapËrvayoga) is advocated in it, but because it contains a wealth of 
viewpoints and suggestions which stimulate independent reflection on the relation [98] 
between language, thought and reality (and that insight in this relation was a factor in 
attaining liberation was accepted by several schools, Brahmanical and Buddhist)." In 
other words, probably the Våkyapad¥ya is not really intended to help its readers to 
attain liberation, and if at all, then because it stimulates reflection on the relation 
between language, thought and reality. 
 It is appropriate to raise some objections against this conclusion. To begin with, 
the Våkyapad¥ya states in so many words that grammar is the door to liberation; it is not 
                                                
1Preceding articles of this series have been published in the following periodicals and books: Bulletin d'Études 
Indiennes 6 (1988), 105-143 (no. 1: "L'auteur et la date de la V®tti"); Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 15 (1989), 
101-117 (no. 2: "Bhart®hari and M¥måµså"); Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 45 (1991), 5-18 (no. 3: 
"Bhart®hari on spho†a and universals"); id. 46.1 (1992), 56-80 (no. 4: "L'absolu dans le Våkyapad¥ya et son lien avec 
le Madhyamaka"); id. 47.1 (1993), 75-94 (no. 5: "Bhart®hari and Vaiße∑ika"); Felicitation Volume for Pt. Bhagavat 
(no. 6: "The author of the Three Centuries"). I thank Jan Houben for useful comments. 
2References to the secondary literature in Houben, 1992: 416 n. 439. 
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our business to discard this statement as not expressing the view of its author, without 
strong evidence to support this. Second, even though meditative practice is often 
regarded a method to obtain liberation, this is by no means the only method known in 
India. Insight is an equally prominent method, which in certain religious currents 
completely supplants meditation. But this insight — and this leads us to the third 
objection — is rarely, if ever, concerned with the relation between language, thought 
and reality. Houben refers in a footnote to the Bhå∑ya onYoga SËtra 3.17, according to 
which he who knows the difference between word, cognition and thing-meant is ‘all-
knowing’ (sarvavid).3 But this is almost a passing observation in a text which never 
links this kind of knowledge with liberation. Liberating insight in most Brahmanical 
traditions is concerned, wholly or at least in part, with the true nature of the self, or 
soul. The Våkyapad¥ya, on the other hand, never presents insight into the true nature of 
the soul as in any way conducive to liberation. This leaves us with the question: how 
does grammar, or the teaching of the Våkyapad¥ya, or both, lead to liberation? 
 In order to answer this question, we can, with Houben, discard the possibility 
that Bhart®hari advocated some sort of meditative way as leading to the ultimate aim. 
Nothing is said about it in the Våkyapad¥ya, so that, if it played any role at all, then 
only a minor one. It seems indeed wiser to assume that Bhart®hari expected some sort of 
knowledge, or insight, to do the job. But what kind of knowledge? 
 The Våkyapad¥ya speaks at several places of a special kind of knowledge, which 
it describes as ‘pure’, or as belonging to the seers (®∑i). This kind of knowledge is 
beyond the reach of language, and has no external objects, [99] or it has the form of the 
totality of objects. The following verses show this: "Knowledge arising from a defect 
[in the organs of perception] and supernormal knowledge [of the seers], verbal usage 
does not take place on the basis of these two; words are based on everyday life."4 This 
verse mentions supernormal knowledge, literally knowledge which is not of this world 
(alaukika). Another verse deals with the same topic: "What the seers see and what is 
established in [the highest] reality, is not expressed in language, it is not based on 
words."5 The following two verses introduce the idea of purity: "To have the form of 
the totality of objects, without [dependence on] a support, is purity of cognition. Some 
say that [if] it has a purity which is without any form whatsoever, [this] is still higher 
than that [other purity]. It is indeed a distortion of the cognition, when it follows an 
outer form. It acquires a kind of impurity, which arises from the close connection when 
                                                
3He also refers to a remark by Paul Williams to the extent "that the purpose of writing the Madhyamakakårikå would 
have been ‘to destroy adherence to language and secondly to the referents of language’". This comes closer to the 
truth, as will be argued below. 
4VP 2.297: yac copaghåtajaµ jñånaµ yac ca jñånam alaukikam/ na tåbhyåµ vyavahåro 'sti ßabdå lokanibandhanå˙// 
Tr. Houben, 1992: 408-09. 
5VP 2.139: ®∑¥ˆåµ darßanaµ yac ca tattve kiµcid avasthitam/ na tena vyavahåro 'sti na tac chabdanibandhanam// 
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there is commingling [with the object]."6 VP 1.37 speaks of those ‘whose minds are not 
distorted’ (anupaplutacetas) and ‘in whom insight has manifested itself’ 
(åvirbhËtaprakåßa); they have knowledge of the past and of the future. The following 
verse VP 1.38 refers probably to the same beings when it states that "with the vision of 
a seer they see things which are beyond the senses and unknowable".7 
 It would seem reasonable to assume that the pure knowledge referred to by 
Bhart®hari constitutes the insight which leads to liberation. Before we address the 
question how this special knowledge is obtained, it is necessary to point out that it is, at 
least for Bhart®hari, a special knowledge indeed. Much of his Våkyapad¥ya shows the 
close interrelationship of language and thought, and indeed of language and the world. 
The following lines are particularly clear in this respect: "The capacity residing in 
words holds this whole universe together."8 "There is no cognition in the world that 
does not [100] follow language. All knowledge appears as if permeated by words."9 We 
must conclude that the word loke ‘in the world’ in this last citation is meant to exclude 
knowledge which is not of this world, which is alaukika. 
 In itself it is not particularly surprising that Bhart®hari admits the existence of 
supernormal knowledge, which goes beyond the realm of language, for he equally 
accepts the existence of a higher reality, which he sometimes calles Brahman. In a 
recent publication I have argued that this higher, or rather highest, reality is the 
undivided totality of all that exists, has existed and will exist. Our ordinary reality — 
which is strictly speaking not real at all — is the result of (unreal) divisions of the 
absolute reality. Responsible, or at any rate co-responsible, for this division is language. 
Ordinary knowledge corresponds to the form of reality that has been divided, distorted 
by language. In the words of the Våkyapad¥ya: "The resemblance of division is a 
persistent distortion of cognition and speech."10 Pure knowledge, on the other hand, 
corresponds to reality that has not been affected by division and speech. 
 How is this superior knowledge obtained? Some verses indicate that traditional 
knowledge and grammar in particular have an important role to play here: "Even the 
knowledge of the seers is preceded by tradition."11 "Therefore the purification of the 
word is the perfection of the highest Self. He who knows the truth of the employments 
                                                
6VP 3.3.56-57: sarvårtharËpatå ßuddhir jñånasya nirupåßrayå/ tato 'py asya paråµ ßuddhim eke pråhur arËpikåm// 
upaplavo hi jñånasya båhyåkårånupåtitå/ kålu∑yam iva tat tasya saµsarge vyatibhedajam// Tr. Houben, 1992: 411, 
modified. 
7VP 1.37-38: åvirbhËtaprakåßånåm anupaplutacetasåm/ at¥tånågatajñånaµ pratyak∑ån na vißi∑yate// at¥ndriyån 
asaµvedyån paßyanty år∑eˆa cak∑u∑å/ ye bhåvån vacanaµ te∑åµ nånumånena bådhyate// 
8VP 1.122 ab: ßabde∑v evåßritå ßaktir vißvasyåsya nibandhan¥. Tr. Houben, 1992: 109. 
9VP 1.131: na so 'sti pratyayo loke ya˙ ßabdånugamåd ®te/ anuviddham iva jñånaµ sarvaµ ßabdena bhåsate// Tr. 
Houben, 1992: 109. 
10VP 1.88ab: bhedånukåro jñånasya våcaß copaplavo dhruva˙. 
11VP 1.30cd: ®∑¥ˆåm api yaj jñånaµ tad apy ågamapËrvakam. 
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of [the word] attains the immortal Brahman."12 Whatever the precise meaning of the 
expression ‘highest Self’ in this last verse, it is clear that purification of the word is an 
important step — perhaps the most important step — towards the highest goal. Yet 
grammar does not directly produce the highest knowledge; according to Bhart®hari, 
who does not mince his words, it describes nescience: "It is only nescience which is 
described in the [different] sciences [of grammar] through different modes of 
derivation. [Real] knowledge, on the other hand, arises spontaneously, free from the 
alternatives of tradition. Just as an effect is inexplicable, not being related to its causes, 
just so [real] knowledge, too, is inexplicable; it only appears to be obtained by means of 
the science [of grammar]."13 
[101] 
 These last two verses, and especially the comparison with an effect, are 
revealing. For Bhart®hari, a material effect — such as a vase — does not really have 
parts, it has no real link with its material causes. More generally, for Bhart®hari 
totalities are more real than their supposed constituent parts. Supreme knowledge and 
the forms of nescience taught by grammar relate to each other much like wholes relate 
to their parts. We may need the parts in order to come to grips with the whole, but once 
we know the whole, we also know that the parts do not really exist. This kind of 
reasoning is familiar to students of Bhart®hari, especially in the case of linguistic units: 
sounds are no more than means to come to know words, in reality they do not exist; 
words are non-existing parts of sentences, which alone exist, etc. 
 It appears, then, that the highest knowledge is obtained as the result of a kind of 
quantum jump, precondition for which is the study of grammar. Details of the process 
are hard to find in the Våkyapad¥ya, but we can with some plausibility imagine the 
following order of events: first we learn that grammatical elements (sounds, or stems 
and suffixes) are no more than means to gain access to the word; then we learn that 
words have no real existence either, that they are but steps leading to the sentence; 
subsequently we pass to even larger units, such as the Veda. In this way we prepare our 
mind for the highest truth, that only the totality of all really exists. Once we have 
reached this insight, all preceding steps reveal themselves as so many forms of 
nescience, dealing with non-existing entities. 
 It is not necessary here to further dwell upon Bhart®hari's position according to 
which the constituent parts of words are not really existing, and words are mere means 
to obtain the flash of understanding (pratibhå) which is the meaning of the sentence. 
                                                
12VP 1.144: tasmåd ya˙ ßabdasaµskåra˙ så siddhi˙ paramåtmana˙/ tasya prav®ttitattvajñas tad brahmåm®tam 
aßnute// Tr. Houben, 1992: 415. 
13VP 2.233-234: ßåstre∑u prakriyåbhedair avidyaivopavarˆyate/ anågamavikalpå tu svayaµ vidyopavartate// 
anibaddhaµ nimitte∑u nirupåkhyaµ phalaµ yathå/ tathå vidyåpy anåkhyeyå ßåstropåyeva lak∑yate// 
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What is of particular interest in the present context is Akamatsu's observation (1993: 
41): "Clearly Bhart®hari treats pratibhå as the same kind of cognition as extraordinary 
perceptions." Akamatsu bases this observation on the similarities between VP 1.35-37, 
which discusses extraordinary perception, and VP 2.143-152, which deals with 
pratibhå. Both are inexplicable (asamåkhyeya, anåkhyeya). What is more, pratibhå 
assumes the form of the whole (sårvarËpyam ivåpannå; 2.145); we remember that the 
purity of cognition, according to VP 3.3.56, cited above, is precisely ‘to have the form 
of the totality of objects’ (sarvårtharËpatå ßuddhir jñånasya). Our proposal that the 
Veda, by being a linguistic unit larger, much larger, than the sentence, plays a role in 
the process leading to the highest insight, is supported by VP 1.5, which speaks of the 
Veda as the means for attaining (pråptyupåya) Brahman, and as its imitative 
resemblance (anukåra). 
[102] 
 VP 1.14ab states: "[Grammar] is the door to liberation, the cure of the impurities 
of speech."14 The second half of this line seems, at first sight, to speak of grammatical 
mistakes. After the passages we have considered above, it will be clear that it speaks 
about more than just this. Grammar helps us to reach pure knowledge, which is non-
verbal. The impurities of speech, from this point of view, are the impurities which 
attach to ordinary knowledge. The highest knowledge is free from the impurities of 
speech, and grammar helps to remove these. 
 
 Our reflections up to this point have not yet addressed the central question, why 
knowledge which is beyond speech should lead to liberation. Where did Bhart®hari get 
this idea from? A far more common way to liberation in Brahmanism, one indeed 
which is accepted, in one way or another, in all so-called orthodox systems of 
Brahmanical philosophy, has as key element the insight into the true nature of the self. 
In Bhart®hari's philosophy, on the other hand, insight into the true nature of the self 
does not appear to play any role whatsoever. His method is altogether different. How do 
we explain this? To my knowledge, there is only one movement in early classical India, 
besides Bhart®hari himself, which accepts knowledge of the kind specified by 
Bhart®hari as leading to the highest aim. This is Mahåyåna Buddhism. Since this 
situation can be explained in the case of Mahåyåna Buddhism as the result of a 
historical development, whereas Bhart®hari's Brahmanical background does not help us 
to explain the presence of these ideas in his philosophy, it seems exceedingly likely that 
Bhart®hari has, in this respect, been influenced by Mahåyåna Buddhism. Let us consider 
the situation within Buddhism somewhat more closely. 
                                                
14VP 1.14ab: tad dvåram apavargasya vå∫malånåµ cikitsitam. 
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 Buddhism knows a number of ways leading to the highest goal. The one that 
interests us at present is the cultivation of a series of ‘perfections’, known both in 
Íråvakayåna (or Mainstream Buddhism)15 and Mahåyåna. In Mahåyåna this series 
comes to occupy an important position indeed, and among the various perfections, it is 
the perfection of wisdom (prajñåpåramitå) which gains pride of place. Some texts even 
claim that wisdom is sufficient unto itself and that the other perfections are 
unnecessary. Indeed, Råhulabhadra's Prajñåpåramitåstotra (v. 17) calls it "the one path 
to salvation"16 (tr. Conze, 1954: 149). The A∑†asåhasrikå (ch. 3, p. 81-82) states [103] 
that "the perfection of wisdom controls, guides and leads the five perfections". Further: 
"The five perfections are in this manner contained in the perfection of wisdom, and the 
term ‘perfection of wisdom’ is just a synonym for the fulfillment of the six perfections. 
In consequence, when the perfection of wisdom is proclaimed, all the six perfections 
are proclaimed. Just as ge[r]ms, scattered about in the great earth, grow when all 
conditions are favourable; and the great earth is their support, and they grow supported 
by the great earth; even so, embodied in the perfection of wisdom, the five perfections 
rest in all-knowledge, they grow supported by the perfection of wisdom; and as upheld 
by the perfection of wisdom do they get the name of ‘perfections’. So it is just the 
perfection of wisdom that controls, guides and leads the five perfections."17 (tr. Conze, 
1973: 111-12.) 
 What is this wisdom or perfection of wisdom? For a number of Mahåyåna texts 
it is non-conceptual awareness (nirvikalpakajñåna), which has emptiness (ßËnyatå) as 
object.18 It is beyond the realm of speech. The A∑†asåhasrikå (ch. 7, p. 177) explains: 
"Where there is no perception, appellation, conception or conventional expression, 
there one speaks of ‘perfect wisdom’."19 (tr. Conze, 1973: 138). 
 The following are some passages from the Mahå-Prajñåpåramitå-Íåstra 
attributed (though wrongly) to Någårjuna, in the paraphrase of K. Venkata Ramanan 
(1966: 280, 286): "The six påramitås and the prajñåpåramitå are one and the same thing 
and not different." "The different kinds of knowledge are the different levels and phases 
                                                
15 This is the expression preferred by Harrison (1990: xviii n. 8; 1992: 77-78 n. 8). 
16buddhai˙ pratyekabuddhaiß ca ßråvakaiß ca ni∑evitå/ mårgas tvam ekå mok∑asya nåsty anya iti ni∑caya˙// This set 
of 21 verses is printed on pp. 1 and 2 of Vaidya's edition of the A∑†asåhasrikå; according to Vaidya they constitute 
the Prajñåpåramitåstuti of Någårjuna. 
17A∑†asåhasrikå (ed. Vaidya) ch. 3, p. 40 l. 28 - p. 41 l. 4: prajñåpåramitå pañcånåµ påramitånåµ pËrvaµgamå 
nåyikå pariˆåyikå/ anena yogena antargatå˙ pañca påramitå˙ prajñåpåramitåyåm eva ånanda 
∑a†påramitåparipËrˆådhivacanam etad yad uta prajñåpåramiteti/ tasmåt tarhi ånanda prajñåpåramitåyåµ 
parik¥rtitåyåµ sarvå˙ ∑a† påramitå˙ parik¥rtitå bhavanti/ tad yathåpi nåma ånanda mahåp®thivyåµ b¥jåni prak¥rˆåni 
såmagr¥µ labhamånåni virohanti/ mahåp®thiv¥ ca te∑åµ b¥jånåµ prati∑†hå/ mahåp®thiv¥prati∑†hitåni ca tåni b¥jåni 
virohanti/ evam eva ånanda prajñåpåramitåsaµg®h¥tå˙ pañca påramitå˙ sarvajñatåyåµ prati[ti]∑†hante/ 
prajñåpåramitåprati∑†hitå˙ pañca påramitå virohanti/ prajñåpåramitåparig®h¥tatvåc ca påramitånåmadheyaµ labhante/ 
tasmåt tarhi ånanda prajñåpåramitaiva pañcånåµ påramitånåµ pËrvaµgamå nåyikå pariˆåyikå// 
18See Williams, 1989: 42 f.  
19A∑†asåhasrikå (ed. Vaidya) ch. 7, p. 89 l. 18: yadå na bhavati saµjñå samajñå prajñaptir vyavahåra˙, tadå 
prajñåpåramitety ucyate. 
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of understanding. All these different levels and phases are alike called prajñå, and the 
entire course of understanding culminates in the complete knowledge of the true nature 
of things. It is the ideal of this complete knowledge, which is of the Buddha, viz., 
sarvåkårajñatå, the knowledge of all forms, that inspires the bodhisattva from the very 
beginning." 
[104] 
 The parallelism with Bhart®hari's thought is striking. The highest reality for 
Bhart®hari is not emptiness, but like emptiness it is beyond the range of speech. 
Knowledge of this highest reality, too, is beyond speech, and free from speech. The 
Buddhist texts, like Bhart®hari, speak of knowledge of all forms, or of the all. The 
A∑†asåhasrikå (7.171) calls the perfection of wisdom "identical with all-knowledge"20 
(tr. Conze, 1973: 135). Conze (1951: 137) states, quite generally: "From a positive 
point of view, salvation is described as Omniscience." 
 Similar ideas are current in Yogåcåra Buddhism. There too, liberating insight is 
free from all conceptual awareness (vikalpa), beyond speech and thought. Its content is 
truth (tathatå). Lambert Schmithausen (1978: 112 f.) has investigated the history of this 
particular content of liberating insight, and observed that this truth concerned originally 
dependent origination, and subsequently the selflessness (nairåtmya) of things. A 
further development took place in connection with the illusionistic ontology of 
Mahåyåna. Tathatå now concerns the essencelessness of all there is, including the 
elements of Buddhist ontology, the dharmas. In Yogåcåra sources, however, tathatå 
frequently takes on the character of a positive reality, of an absolute being which hides 
behind the unreal phenomenal world. Here, in particular, we come close to the ideas of 
Bhart®hari. 
 
 There are many aspects of Bhart®hari's thought where the influence of Buddhism 
is clearly noticeable. His conception of the highest reality is an example, as I have tried 
to show elsewhere.21 His view as to to what extent the world of our daily experience is 
determined by language, is another example.22 The present paper has tried to show that 
even his ideas about the ultimate religious aim, and how to reach it, may have been bor-
rowed from the Buddhists. To all this we must however add that Bhart®hari never bor-
rows ideas without thoroughly adjusting them to their new surroundings. Many of his 
ideas may be Buddhist in origin, together they constitute Bhart®hari's philosophy which, 
as such, is not Buddhist at all. His is the philosophy of a traditional Brahmin, who man-
                                                
20A∑†asåhasrikå (ed. Vaidya) ch. 7, p. 86 l. 13: sarvajñataiva bhagavan prajñåpåramitå. 
21 Bronkhorst, 1992. 
22Bronkhorst, 1996. 
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ages to adjust the Buddhist and other ideas in such a way, that they come to contribute 
to a Veda-centered view of the world. 
[105] 
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